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Alberto Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner 
When Ronald Reagan won the presidential election of  1980 and the Republi- 
cans gained control of the Senate for the first time since 1954, did American 
voters reject past policies and indicate a permanent shift to the right? Or was 
the 1980 election a predictable response to the perceived mismanagement of 
the economy in the late seventies with no long-run implications? Did the eco- 
nomic policies that were adopted during the  1980s reflect a long-term shift 
toward conservatism, or were they merely extensions of past policies with, at 
most, a short-lived shift to the right during the two  years (1981-82)  when 
Republicans had effective control of the White House and Congress? More 
generally, how  did politics influence the economic policy decisions in the 
1980s? 
The eight chapters included in  this volume examine the evidence. They 
study voting patterns, monetary and fiscal policies, welfare spending, tax re- 
form, minimum-wage legislation, the savings and loan debacle, and interna- 
tional trade policy. Taken together, they indicate that a sharp temporary shift 
to the right followed the 1980 election, as evidenced by the policies adopted 
during the early years of the first Reagan administration. Subsequently, the 
Democratic gains in the congressional  elections of 1982, 1984, and especially 
1986, contributed to moderate the administration’s policies. 
voting 
Morris P.  Fiorina’s analysis of  voting patterns in the  1980s supports this 
view.  He notes that Jimmy Carter faced the 1980 election with double digit 
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inflation and a stagnant economy. Carter probably would have lost in 1980 on 
economic issues alone, even leaving aside the problem of  the hostages held 
by  Iran. In fact, several studies of  previous elections have emphasized that 
slow growth and (to a lesser extent) high inflation significantly hurt incumbent 
presidents.’ Thus, Carter’s defeat does not imply a sharp realignment of the 
electorate toward the right. 
The Democrats’ loss of the Senate in 1980 was more unusual than their loss 
of the presidency, but again, it was a reaction to the specific events of the late 
1970s rather than the result of a long-term shift in party allegiance. In fact, 
the large number of  Republican victories in  the Senate was  not repeated in 
subsequent elections. In particular, the elections of  1982 and  1986 continued 
the pattern of  midterm voting cycles in  which the party holding the White 
House loses votes and seats in Congress. The presidential elections of  1984 
and 1988 are also consistent with historical patterns. Reagan’s reelection and 
Bush’s victory confirm that voters favor incumbents and look at the rate of 
change in income and in prices in the election year when choosing  presidents.2 
In summary, Fiorina finds that the election results of  the  1980s can be 
largely explained by  the short-run performance of  the economy in election 
years, and by the midterm cycle. In his comments to this paper, William D. 
Nordhaus notes that the apparent popularity of Republicans and their grip on 
the presidency could evaporate at the first reappearance of  recession or infla- 
tion. 
However, Fiorina also reports a longer-term shift in voters’ attitudes in fa- 
vor of the Republican party, especially in the upper middle class. The percent- 
age of voters who identified themselves as Republicans in surveys rose from 
about 33 percent in  1962-82  to about 40 percent in  1984-88.  Measures of 
party identification are obtained by asking voters in surveys whether they per- 
ceive themselves as Democrats (weakly or strongly), Republicans (weakly or 
strongly), or independents. Party identification reflects the voter’s ideological 
bias in favor of  a party and is influenced by  several economic and noneco- 
nomic factors. Thus, voters may identify themselves as Democrats, even if 
they occasionally vote for a Republican candidate: party identification reflects 
long-run attitudes of the electorate and may differ from the actual voting be- 
havior in  each election. For instance, Jimmy Carter in  1980 was  defeated 
when many voters who identified themselves as Democrats voted for Ronald 
Reagan as a reaction to Carter’s perceived failures. Fiorina’s results suggests 
that some of  these voters may  now  consider themselves “permanently” Re- 
publican. 
Voting in the eighties, particularly in the second half, also confirms a pat- 
tern that is becoming increasingly common in American political history: di- 
vided government-that  is, a situation in which the same party does not con- 
trol the presidency, the House, and the Senate. One explanation, formalized 
elsewhere by Fiorina and others, suggests that divided government is the re- 
sult of a conscious attempt by the voters to achieve moderate policy.3  Accord- 3  Introduction 
ing to this view,  the American electorate has to choose between two parties 
that offer different policy options. Voters in the middle of the political spec- 
trum desire policies in between those advocated by  the median members of 
the two parties. These voters may prefer divided government rather than uni- 
fied government: if  different parties hold the presidency and Congress, they 
balance each other, and the resulting policy outcome is more centrist than 
would be with a unified government. 
This desire for moderation may explain both split-ticket voting when Pres- 
idential and Congressional elections are held  simultaneously, and the mid- 
term voting cycle. Both phenomena occurred in the 1980s; in this respect the 
last decade was far from unusual. In fact, a recurring theme of this book is the 
constraint placed on the ability of  the Reagan administration to pursue con- 
servative policies after the  1982 elections increased Democratic strength in 
the House, and especially after the Democratic party regained the majority in 
the Senate after the 1986 mid-term elections. 
Monetary Policy 
James E. Alt’s study in this volume of  monetary policy in the 1980s also 
emphasizes the importance of the balance of power between Congress and the 
president. He suggests that the Federal Reserve can be viewed as an agent 
with three principals: the president, Congress, and the financial community. 
The chairman of the Federal Reserve has a certain amount of independence, 
which he wants to preserve for himself and for the institution. Alt emphasizes 
that an agent with multiple principals enjoys a fair amount of autonomy when 
the principals disagree, which may be the case when the presidency and Con- 
gress are held by  different parties. In addition to the goal of  independence, 
Fed chairmen may want to enhance their chances of reappointment. Alt ex- 
amines how different politicoeconomic  models can explain the Fed’s behavior, 
given this principal-agent relationship and the chairmen’s goals of  indepen- 
dence and reappointment. 
Earlier studies have suggested two explanations for political influence over 
monetary policy. The first suggests that Democratic administrations are more 
expansionary than Republican administrations because the former care rela- 
tively more about unemployment (and less about inflation) than the latter.4 
The second emphasizes that presidents are almost exclusively concerned with 
reelection and thus engage in preelectoral manipulations of monetary policy 
to boost gr~wth.~ 
Alt blends these two approaches by arguing that, at the beginning of a new 
administration, Fed chairmen tend to accommodate the president’s partisan 
goals. When an election approaches, the Fed tends to follow a prudent course 
of action for two reasons. On one hand, the Fed wants to avoid preelectoral 
contractions in  order not to jeopardize the incumbent’s performance at the 
polls. On the other hand, the Fed avoids policies that are too clearly expan- 4  Albert0 Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner 
sionary and thus favorable to the incumbent. In fact, the Fed wants to preserve 
its reputation for independence and  avoid displeasing the challenger who, 
after all, may be the next president. Finally, the Fed may need to balance these 
political influences with the financial community’s preference for stability in 
financial markets. 
Monetary policy in the eighties was largely consistent with traditional Fed 
behavior, as described by these models. By  1979, inflation was perceived as 
the most serious economic problem, and  the Carter administration and the 
Federal Reserve were held at least partly responsible for it. In the fall of 1979, 
one year before the presidential elections of  1980, Carter needed to support 
anti-inflationary policies to avoid losing control of  the economy and  of  the 
election.6  Therefore, he appointed Paul Volcker as chairman of the Fed, who 
immediately shifted monetary policy to target the money  supply instead of 
interest rates and began to slow the growth of  the money supply to reduce 
inflation. 
In  1981 and  1982, with a new  Republican president and  a conservative 
Congress, the Fed received full political support for its tough, anti-inflation- 
ary policy. In these years, the United States experienced the deepest recession 
since the thirties, but inflation was quickly reduced. The weak  Democratic 
contingent in Congress could do little to oppose this course of action. 
In the summer of  1982, the Fed loosened its policy and started to rely less 
on monetary targeting. This change of policy can be explained by the feeling 
that inflation had been reduced substantially and the economy needed help to 
recover. Also the threat of financial crises due to the less developed countries’ 
(LDCs’) debt problem and the difficulties of the savings and loan institutions 
(S&Ls) may have influenced the Fed’s decision. After 1982, Democratic gains 
in Congress reduced the political support for further anti-inflationary policies. 
In his comments on Alt’s paper, Benjamin M. Friedman notes that the Fed 
decreased its reliance on monetary targeting after 1982 because of the collapse 
of the relation between money growth and the growth of nominal income. In 
addition, Friedman emphasizes how the Fed’s independence is enhanced not 
only by  the multiplicity of principals, but  also by  the fact that each of the 
principals (Congress, the administration, and the financial community) may 
not have homogeneous preferences. 
Fiscal Policy: Taxing, Spending, and the Deficit 
Some of the most dramatic changes in economic policy during the 1980s 
involved fiscal policy, particularly in  the first two years of  the Republican 
administration. Military spending grew substantially, many social programs 
were cut back; tax rates fell sharply and the federal budget deficit soared. 
Some of these policies reflect traditional Republican views; in addition, some 
of  these changes, like an increase in military spending, were initiated at the 
end  of  the  Carter  administration.  However,  Reagan’s  fiscal  policies  in 5  Introduction 
1981-82  viewed together represent a substantial departure from the seventies, 
including previous Republican presidents. 
One dramatic piece of evidence of Reagan’s departure from previous fiscal 
policy is the budget deficit. The most economically relevant measure of accu- 
mulated deficits is the debt/GNP ratio. This ratio shows a downward trend in 
the post-World  War I1 period. Starting from a peak of  1.17 in 1945, this ratio 
was 0.23 in 1980. The large deficits in the eighties clearly reversed this trend: 
the debt/GNP ratio was 0.35 in 1985 and about 0.30 in  1989.’ The deficit’s 
share of  GNP peaked at 6.3 percent in 1983, and then fell gradually for the 
next six years, particularly after the defense buildup slowed after 1986. By 
1989, the deficit was 2.9 percent of  GNP,  about its share of  output at the 
beginning of the decade. 
Republican presidents traditionally have vigorously opposed budget defi- 
cits. In contrast, Reagan spoke out most strongly against tax increases and 
used his political power to oppose legislation that would raise tax rates and 
revenue, even if that opposition meant continued high deficits. Congressional 
Democrats, traditionally less concerned with deficits than Republican presi- 
dents, refused to cut spending, even though that also meant high deficits. 
Mathew D. McCubbins in his contribution to this volume suggests that the 
increase in budget deficits was the result of  “divided government,” particu- 
larly of the control of the Senate and the House by different parties. He sug- 
gests that such divided control leads to fiscal deadlocks and prisoners’ dilem- 
mas, which resulted in spending in excess of  tax revenues. Republicans and 
Democrats in Congress favor different spending programs. If the two legisla- 
tive branches are controlled by  different parties, they reconcile their differ- 
ences by increasing spending on both parties’ favored programs. The result is 
higher spending than would occur if either party had undivided control of the 
legislature. 
A different explanation is that the large deficits in the early eighties were 
the result of  miscalculations.  First the supply-siders in  the administration 
vastly overestimated the incentive effects of  the  1981  tax cut. Second, the 
recession of  1982 turned out to be the worst in post-World  War I1 history and 
worse than was predicted. Third, inflation fell faster than anticipated, further 
decreasing revenues below their expected levels. The indexation of the indi- 
vidual income tax, which took effect in  1985, permanently eliminated the 
automatic source of  increased revenues brought by inflation. When revenues 
fell sharply below planned expenditures, political and legislative inertia and 
the combined effects of various pressure groups made it difficult to correct the 
mistake. That is, politically costly decisions needed to stop the growth of the 
debt were postponed because of the difficulty of reaching a compromise over 
budget cuts or tax increases of the size needed to balance the budget. 
A third political explanation, which does not rely on large miscalculations, 
is that the debt accumulation of the early eighties was a strategic attempt by 
the Reagan administration to constrain spending by  future Democratic Con- 6  Albert0 Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner 
gresses or future Democratic presidents. By creating large deficits whose ef- 
fects would persist after the Republicans lost control of the Senate, the Reagan 
administration reduced the flexibility available to Democratic legislators to 
increase nonmilitary spending. With a large deficit and a rapidly increasing 
interest bill,  it is difficult to justify  major increases in spending programs, 
particularly if tax increases are viewed as economically and politically costly. 
Thus, the debt is the legacy of the Reagan administration to the f~ture.~  Ac- 
cording to this argument, Reagan accepted large deficits because he was more 
committed to a reallocation of  spending priorities than previous Republican 
presidents. 
In his comments on McCubbins, Robert J. Barro argues that a large part of 
the history of the U.S. budget can be explained by the tax-smoothing model.lo 
This theory suggests that it is optimal to finance unusual increases in spend- 
ing, such as those occurring during wars or severe recessions, primarily with 
debt rather than with tax revenues. Smooth tax revenues and fluctuating defi- 
cits (and surpluses) distort the economy less than balanced budgets and fluc- 
tuating taxes. Indeed this theory is broadly consistent with the steady decline, 
with minor deviations for recessions and local wars, in the ratio of  debt to 
GNP since its peak at the end of World War 11. 
Whether or not the tax-smoothing model explains the deficits in the 1980s 
is debatable: the debt/GNP ratio almost doubled in a decade without major 
wars. The military buildup of the eighties can be viewed as once-and-for-all 
effort to win the Cold War, for which it would have been optimal to run tem- 
porary deficits. The collapse of  the Soviet bloc lends some support to this 
view, but recent events in Eastern Europe have deeper roots than the American 
military buildup. Furthermore, increased military spending accounts for only 
a fraction of the increase in the deficit. The tax cut of  1981 played a larger 
role: the tax-smoothing model may explain why deficits may have grown to 
finance the military buildup in a cold war period, but it cannot explain why 
taxes were cut. 
One of the recurrent themes in these explanations of the deficits is the poli- 
ticoeconomic struggle over allocation of government expenditure to domestic 
versus defense programs. Thus, it is important to analyze whether this allo- 
cation has substantially changed in the eighties. Although the military buildup 
was a major theme in Reagan's agenda, the buildup was in fact started by 
President Carter. Military spending in real terms fell steadily from 9.6 percent 
of GNP in 1968 to 4.8 percent of GNP in 1977. After two years of constant 
real spending, military spending increased in response to the Soviet invasion 
of  Afghanistan. The Reagan administration sharply accelerated this buildup 
by raising military spending from 5.3 percent of GNP in 1981 to 6.5 percent 
in  1986, when Democrats regained control of  Congress and ended the in- 
creases. By the end of  the decade, before the startling events of  the fall of 
1989, military spending had fallen to less than 6 percent of GNP. 
The military buildup was accompanied by reduction of spending in various 7  Introduction 
social programs, particularly in the first half  of  the first Reagan administra- 
tion. As John A. Ferejohn observes in  his contribution to this volume, the 
programs that were cut the most or eliminated entirely, were those narrowly 
directed at the poor, such as CETA, Job Corps, Head Start, and other educa- 
tion  programs. Spending on broadly based  social insurance programs that 
benefited primarily the middle-class elderly, such as Social Security and Med- 
icare, continued to grow untouched during the 1980s. 
Ferejohn attributes this difference in treatment to the structure of the legis- 
lative process. He argues that the structure of Congressional committees in- 
sulated middle-class programs from attacks; thus,  advocates of  those pro- 
grams could resist administration  pressure for cuts more effectively than could 
supporters of  programs beneficial to the poor. Ferejohn also notes that the 
administration, to a certain extent, managed to circumvent congressional op- 
position by  tightening eligibility standards administratively. In  addition to 
congressional committees, the pressure of  public opinion created great ob- 
stacles to any attempt of reducing Social Security benefits. There was no sim- 
ilar outcry of  voters when the administration proposed cutting poverty pro- 
grams. 
Ferejohn observes that, after the high water mark of  Republican power in 
1981-82,  Democrats resisted further cuts in  social programs. Even before 
they regained control of  the Senate in  1986, they were able to stop further 
efforts by the Reagan administration to change federal spending patterns. He 
concludes the social spending cuts of Reagan administration were less wide- 
spread than  commonly  perceived and  concentrated in  a two-year period. 
Ferejohn also emphasizes the importance of  the Congressional committee 
structure in protecting middle-class programs from further cuts advocated by 
the administration. 
It is interesting to note that once the Democrats regained control of Con- 
gress, they made few attempts to introduce new poverty programs or to return 
existing ones to their former size. In part, this may have been due to the con- 
straints in spending imposed by  the accumulated deficits of the eighties. On 
the other hand, it may indicate a changing attitude: American voters and pol- 
iticians were willing to support such spending under both Republican and 
Democratic presidents from the early 1960s until 1980, but during the 1980s 
this support diminished. This is in sharp contrast to the continued strong sup- 
port for middle-class entitlement programs, which remained essentially un- 
touched throughout the decade. 
Tax  policy  also  underwent  substantial and  frequent change  during the 
1980s. Although the changes that were passed into law, and the debates asso- 
ciated with them, reflect the traditional views of Republicans and Democrats, 
the emphasis of the Reagan administration was somewhat different from those 
of Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford. 
Charles H. Stewart 111,  in his contribution to this volume, describes the 
major tax changes that occurred during the decade. The largest was the Eco- 8  Albert0 Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner 
nomic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 (ERTA), passed in the first months of the 
new  administration at the peak of Reagan’s power. ERTA  cut marginal tax 
rates, substantially increased tax incentives for corporate investment, and in- 
dexed the personal income tax for inflation. 
The following year, Congress had second thoughts about the size of the 
1981 tax cut, and repealed many of  the business tax incentives that had been 
introduced in ERTA. Excise taxes on cigarettes and telephone calls were also 
raised. Then, in  1983, taxes were raised again, as new  federal employees 
were subject to the Social Security payroll tax, and the payroll tax rate and the 
maximum income subject to this tax were increased. Finally, the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act (TRA) continued the trend to lower marginal tax rates but elimi- 
nated many of the tax incentives for business investment that had been favored 
by Republicans for many years. For instance, the 1986 reform eliminated the 
investment tax credit and raised the maximum tax on capital gains from 20 
percent to 28 percent. TRA was designed to be revenue neutral: its signifi- 
cantly reduced personal income tax revenues and  offset this loss with in- 
creased corporate income tax receipts. 
The end result of all this legislation was a major change in the structure of 
federal taxation. The marginal tax rate on the highest income bracket fell from 
70 to 28 percent, many low-income individuals were dropped from the in- 
come tax roles, payroll tax rates and ceilings rose, some personal income tax 
deductions were scaled back, and many corporate tax benefits were elimi- 
nated. 
A recurring theme in the debates over tax policy during the eighties was 
over the need to raise tax revenues after the very large reductions put in place 
by ERTA. If these reductions had not been so large, the debate over tax policy 
probably would not have been so sharp. Stewart emphasizes the decreased 
control by Congressional leaders in setting tax policy as an explanation for the 
size of the 1981 tax cut. When Republican and Democratic leaders in Con- 
gress reasserted their control in later years, tax favors to special interests were 
reduced. 
Stewart also notes that in previous decades inflation pushed taxpayers with 
constant real incomes into higher tax brackets and thus automatically raised 
real tax revenues. Congress could then decide to spend these revenues or to 
take credit with constituents by voting to decrease taxes. When ERTA elimi- 
nated this bracket creep by indexing the personal income tax, revenues no 
longer increased automatically. Any change in taxation that raised total reve- 
nue or cut the taxes of one group required an explicit action to raise taxes on 
another group. Thus, indexing the personal income tax, along with Reagan’s 
opposition to tax increases, also intensified the debate over tax policy. 
David F.  Bradford’s comment on Stewart’s paper discusses the paradox of 
a Republican administration introducing tax changes in ERTA that were ex- 
tremely generous toward business investment and then supporting their elim- 9  Introduction 
ination only five years later in TRA. The explanation for this reversal in policy 
may lie in Reagan’s commitment to lowering marginal tax rates. He was will- 
ing to abandon the investment incentives traditionally favored by Republicans 
in order to bring down the tax rates. 
This decline in the top marginal tax rates coupled with the change in spend- 
ing priorities indicate a shift of emphasis in fiscal policies toward “efficiency” 
at the expense of more “inequality.” 
Deregulation 
An important theme of the Reagan administration’s agenda was the need to 
deregulate the economy. At best, the Reagan administration claimed, govern- 
ment  interference imposed costs on  workers  and  consumers that  far out- 
weighed the benefits to society. More often, government regulations simply 
created red tape that confused the efficient operation of market forces while 
restricting personal freedom. Cutting regulation, along with  cutting social 
spending and marginal tax rates, was thus an area of  major policy change 
during the 1980s. 
Like other policy shifts examined in this volume, the deregulation of  the 
Reagan administration was preceded by actions taken by earlier presidents. In 
particular,  the  Carter  administration eliminated  long-standing government 
regulation of airlines, railroads, trucking, and telecommunications. This pol- 
icy was designed to encourage competition in industries where regulation was 
perceived as benefiting the regulated producers. The purpose of President Car- 
ter’s deregulation was to reduce prices and improve service for consumers by 
increasing competition. In contrast, the deregulation of the Reagan years in- 
volved the loosening of health, safety, environmental regulations which were 
considered unnecessary and inefficient, more generally constraining “market 
forces.”  Much of  this deregulation was accomplished through changes in 
enforcement rather than changes in law. 
An important and long lasting legacy of the eighties is the collapse of much 
of the savings and loan industry and the cost to the government of bailing out 
depositors. The industry’s problems began in the 1970s, when inflation and 
nominal interest rates rose sharply. Since most S&L assets were in long-term 
fixed-interest residential mortgages, a large number of firms in the industry 
suffered a loss of all their equity. Even after interest rates fell in the 1980s, the 
market value of the liabilities of many S&Ls exceeded their assets. 
In most industries, insolvent firms go out of business. Because of  federal 
deposit insurance, insolvent S&Ls could  continue to  operate. With  their 
equity already gone, they could “gamble for resurrection” by lending money 
to very risky projects. If  the projects were successful, the S&Ls won. If  the 
projects failed, the government insurance fund lost. 
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contributed to the S&L debacle, regulators needed to close down “the walking 
dead.” This required tighter regulations,  additional staff  for the regulatory 
agencies, and infusions of cash to pay off the insured depositors. 
Thomas Romer and Barry R. Weingast, in their contribution to this vol- 
ume, examine how a problem that started out as a loss of a few billion dollars 
for the government insurance fund exploded into a debacle that may eventu- 
ally cost much more.I2 They emphasize the role of Congress in responding to 
interest-group pressure from the S&Ls. By offering campaign contributions to 
members of Congress, especially those with key positions on committees con- 
cerned with regulatory agencies, the S&L industry was able to persuade these 
Congressmen to intervene on their behalf  with these agencies. During the 
mid-1980s Congress also blocked,  delayed, or watered down  measures to 
raise the insurance premiums on S&Ls, increase the amount of  capital re- 
quired of owners of  S&Ls, and increase the staff at the regulatory agencies. 
These steps would have allowed the regulators to limit the costs of the S&L 
collapse. 
The administration also played a role in the S&L debacle. Robert E. Litan’s 
comment on Romer and Weingast underscores the importance of  1982 legis- 
lation, supported by the administration, that allowed S&L owners to use fed- 
eral insurance guarantees to expand rapidly without putting in any of  their 
own money. He argues that loosening the capital requirements for S&Ls “in- 
vited high rollers and crooks into the industry.” In addition, the administra- 
tion, given its antiregulation policy, encouraged further loosening of regula- 
tions and opposed increases in staff and budgets of the regulatory agencies. 
Romer and Weingast argue that congressional behavior on this issue was 
simply business as usual: that is, support for narrow interest groups unless 
there is widespread pressure from other parts of society. They observe that the 
president typically represents the interests of  the society at large. However, 
the ideology of  the Reagan administration favoring deregulation meant that 
regulations were loosened when problems first arose, and that measures to 
correct the industry’s problems were delayed until they were extraordinarily 
costly. An administration less opposed to government interference in the econ- 
omy might not have allowed the crisis to grow so large before taking steps to 
correct it. Like health, safety, and environmental deregulation, the deregula- 
tion of the S&L industry during the early 1980s represents a substantial shift 
from the policies of previous administrations. 
Another aspect of  regulation policy is government intervention in  setting 
wages. The history of  the federal minimum wage during the  1980s reflects 
very closely the political trends of the decade. Legislation passed under Pres- 
ident Carter raised the nominal value of the minimum to $3.35 an hour on 1 
January 1981, just as the Reagan administration was about to enter office. For 
most of the decade, Congress took no steps to raise the minimum wage. As a 
result, inflation eroded its purchasing power,  so by  1986 its value in  1981 
dollars had declined to $2.69. 11  Introduction 
As Keith T.  Poole and Howard Rosenthal observe in their contribution to 
this volume, this is entirely consistent with history: no legislature with a Re- 
publican majority has ever voted to increase the minimum wage. By examin- 
ing roll call voting, Poole and Rosenthal argue that the minimum-wage issue 
is in fact, highly ideological. Legislators who can be classified as “right wing” 
according to their overall voting record, tend to be consistently against in- 
creases in  the minimum wage.  Ideology explains voting  on  the minimum 
wage better than the socioeconomic composition of the legislator’s constitu- 
encies. 
It is quite interesting to note that when the Democrats regained control of 
the Senate in January 1987, they failed to pass any minimum-wage legislation 
for more than two years. When Reagan left office, the real value of the mini- 
mum wage in  1981 dollars had declined to $2.41. Even after two years of 
Democratic control of the legislature, the minimum wage in real terms was 
lower than in the sixties and seventies. 
Once Reagan left office, the Democratic Congress wasted no time in nego- 
tiating a higher minimum wage with President Bush. Even this increase, how- 
ever, supports the hypothesis that there was an ideological shift to the right. 
Poole and Rosenthal show that the roll call votes in 1989 followed the same 
right-left pattern that explained earlier votes on this issue, but they find that 
the $3.85 minimum wage passed in 1989 provided for a significantly smaller 
increase than past experience would have predicted. 
In his comments, Charles Brown expresses some doubts over Poole and 
Rosenthal’s calculation showing a decline in the real minimum wage desired 
by  Congress.  Their  conclusion  relies  upon  comparisons of  congressional 
votes in the sixties and in 1989. Brown argues that these votes were on bills 
that were too different to use as the basis for inferences about Congressional 
views on the minimum wage. 
Unlike the minimum wage, which can be described with one number and a 
few measures of coverage, policies that regulate U.S. international trade in- 
clude a wide range of decisions that are often difficult to quantify. I. M. Des- 
tler’s paper describes the major trade issues of the 1980s-the  formal or infor- 
mal protection for autos,  steel,  textiles,  motorcycles semiconductors, and 
machine tools; a free trade agreement with Canada; legislation that created 
new reasons for restricting imports; and more generally harsh rhetoric favor- 
ing “fair trade” rather than “free trade.” Do these changes constitute a basic 
shift in trade policy? 
Destler’s answer is no. He argues that the fundamental pattern of trade pol- 
icy remained steady over the decade, in spite of unprecedented pressures for 
protection. This pattern includes demands by Congress for import protection 
for specific industries, but a willingness to let the administration make most 
specific decisions on trade policy, and an administration that expresses a firm 
commitment to free trade but occasionally gives in to political pressure and 
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Perhaps the biggest change in trade policy in the 1980s was the intensity of 
the pressure for protection. As Destler shows in table 8.1, the U.S. trade def- 
icit rose from about 1 percent of GNP in 1977-82  to 3.5 percent of GNP in 
1987, and then fell to 2.1 percent of GNP in  1989. At the same time that 
imports were rising sharply in the early 1980s, the United States experienced 
its deepest recession in over 40 years. Although the loss of sales due to the 
recession was often larger than the loss due to imports, the combination of the 
two was enough to cause several politically powerful industries to seek import 
protection from the government. Such demands continued even after several 
years of recovery, since the trade imbalance did not disappear. 
Another longer-term source of political pressure for protection was the de- 
cline in U.S.  dominance in the world economy. As the U.S. technological lead 
over other developed countries has eroded, there has also been a long-term 
erosion in support for free trade. Although outright protectionism is still un- 
popular, political pressures have grown for “fair trade” and for unilateral ac- 
tions by the United States that go against the spirit if not the letter of interna- 
tional trade agreements. This long-term pressure is likely to continue even if 
the trade deficit shrinks to pre-1980s levels. 
Anne 0. Krueger, in her comment on Destler’s paper, questions how many 
small changes are necessary to add up to a substantial change in U.S. policy. 
She cites, in particular, the import quotas and VERs on autos, the U.S.- 
Canadian free trade agreement, and the bilateral negotiation over Super-301 
status as steps that undermined the open multilateral trading system. 
Whether these actions constitute a substantial shift in policy is of course a 
matter of judgment. Certainly the Reagan administration did not come into 
office in 1981 urging that the United States abandon free trade philosophies 
espoused since World War 11.  There was no ebbing of protectionist sentiment 
after the elections of 1982 or after the Democrats regained control of Congress 
in 1986. Rather, the Congressional Democrats were the ones urging a change 
in  trade policy, and the Reagan administration defended, in  rhetoric if  not 
always in practice, the policies of past administrations. 
Conclusion 
As the 1980s began, prices were soaring, growth was stagnant and unem- 
ployment was  rising. In  reaction to these events, American voters turned 
against the incumbent party and gave the Republicans control of  the White 
House and the Senate. Conservative Democrats in the House who were sym- 
pathetic to the goals of the Reagan administration gave Republicans effective 
control of the entire Congress. 
This sharp reaction against the Democratic party lasted only until the reces- 
sion and midterm election of  1982, which returned effective control of the 
House to the Democrats and eroded Republican power in the Senate. How- 
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the Reagan administration  to make substantial changes in several areas of eco- 
nomic policy. 
As this introduction has summarized, and the papers in this volume exam- 
ine in  more detail,  during  1981-82  the president proposed and  Congress 
passed a large income tax cut that reduced marginal rates and set the stage for 
an unprecedented increase in the budget deficit, sharp cuts in social spending 
for the poor, and an increase in the military buildup begun under President 
Carter. The Reagan administration considerably weakened enforcement of 
health and safety regulations that had become law during the 1970s and dis- 
continued most  antitrust enforcement. In addition, the administration sup- 
ported the Fed’s anti-inflationary effort. In many areas then, the early eighties 
saw the implementation  of policies traditionally advocated by the right. 
After the 1982  election, and especially after the 1986 election that returned 
full control of Congress to the Democrats, the Reagan administration had dif- 
ficulty implementing conservative policies.  However, there may  also have 
been a longer-term turn to the right that fasted beyond 1982 and beyond 1986. 
One indication of  this is the increasing percentage of  voters who identify 
themselves as Republicans. Another is the failure of the Democrats in Con- 
gress to introduce new social spending programs once they had majorities in 
both houses of Congress. 
One area in  which the Reagan Administration clearly departed not only 
from the seventies but also from traditional conservative values is that of bud- 
get deficits. These deficits are, in part, the result of an inability of liberals and 
conservatives to agree on tax and spending policies, but they are also the result 
of  a significant change in the attitudes of  conservatives and Republicans on 
the relative importance of low deficits versus low taxes and low social spend- 
ing. Republican presidents before the 1980s chose to reach compromises with 
Democratic Congresses that produced smaller deficits, perhaps because the 
distance between the two sides was smaller or because deficits were consid- 
ered more harmful. In either case, persistent large budget deficits and the ac- 
cumulation of debt that they produced are the gift of the 1980s to the future. 
Notes 
1. For instance, Kramer (1971) and Fair (1978, 1988). For a discussion on whether 
the effect of preelection income growth on voting is rational or myopic, see Alesina, 
Londregan, and Rosenthal(1991). 
2.  On the advantage of  incumbents, see Kramer (1971), Fiorina (1981) and Fair 
(1978, 1988). 
3.  See Fiorina (1988, 1991) and Alesina and Rosenthal(1989a,1989b). An interest- 
ing question is why divided government usually has Republican control of the execu- 
tive and Democratic control of Congress, rather than the other way around. One an- 
swer might be  that voters prefer a Republican president in charge of foreign policy and 14  Albert0 Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner 
a Democratic  Congress  setting domestic  spending policies.  Furthermore, given the 
incumbency advantage, once a large number of seats in the House is held by Demo- 
crats, it may take a long time to reverse this situation. Thus, if  voters prefer divided 
governments, they will elect Republican presidents because of the Democratic domi- 
nance in the House. 
4. Seminal work in this area is  by Hibbs (1977, 1987). See also Alesina (1987). 
5.  This is the approach followed by Nordhaus (1975) and Tufte (1978).  For two 
recent surveys that provide somewhat different views regarding the literature on the 
politics of monetary policy, see Alesina (1988) and Nordhaus (1989). 
6. Note that the timing of Carter’s macroeconomic policy is opposite from the “po- 
litical business cycle” hypothesis (Nordhaus 1975). Rather than expanding the econ- 
omy immediately before the election, Carter followed an anti-inflationary policy in 
1980. This does not imply that Carter was not interested in reelection: at that time, 
inflation was perceived by the voters as the most pressing economic problem. 
7. This measure of the debt does not include debt held by the Federal Reserve and 
other Government agencies. McCubbins (in this volume) uses a different measure. 
8.  The “miscalculation theory” is suggested by Stockman (1987). For a critical dis- 
cussion of this view, see Friedman (1988). 
9. For a nontechnical exposition of this argument, see Friedman (1988). For a for- 
mal treatment, see Persson and Svensson (1988) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990). 
10. For a more extensive treatment of this theory see Barro (1985, 1986, 1987). 
11.  Viscusi (forthcoming) notes that the Reagan administration sharply reduced the 
enforcement of health and safety regulations during its first two years but made little 
attempt to reform or rationalize the regulations that they considered objectionable. 
After this initial period, according to Viscusi, regulatory policy “resembled that of the 
pre-Reagan era.” 
12. Kane (1989, 87) estimates that the cost to the federal government of  paying off 
insured depositors at insolvent thrifts rose from $3 billion in 1982 to $63 billion in the 
middle of  1988. Since then, the cost of the bailout has undoubtedly risen considerably. 
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